In this paper it is proposed that important components of moral development and moral judgment rely on two forms of emotional learning: stimulus-reinforcement and response-outcome learning. Data in support of this position will be primarily drawn from work with individuals with the developmental condition of psychopathy as well as fMRI studies with healthy individuals. Individuals with psychopathy show impairment on moral judgment tasks and a pronounced increased risk for instrumental antisocial behavior. It will be argued that these impairments are developmental consequences of impaired stimulus-aversive conditioning on the basis of distress cue reinforcers and response-outcome learning in individuals with this disorder.
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Introduction
The field of moral development and moral reasoning has been transformed over the past twenty years. In the early 90s, there was one dominant view: moral reasoning involved decisions based on accessing conceptual domains (e.g., Colby & Kohlberg, 1987) . Moral development involved the construction of these conceptual domains through some form of rational thought processes. With very few exceptions (e.g., Kagan & Lamb, 1987) , there was little consideration given to any role of emotion in moral development/reasoning. Then, in the mid 1990s, the first studies to use results from psychopathy to infer the core role of emotion in moral development were conducted (e.g., Blair, 1995; Blair, Jones, Clark, & Smith, 1995) . These were followed by seminal fMRI studies indicating that moral reasoning recruits brain regions implicated in emotion processing (e.g., Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Moll, De Oliveira-Souza, Bramati, & Grafman, 2002) .
The aim of this paper is to consider the role of emotional learning in the development of morality. In particular, this paper will consider two forms of emotional learning: stimulusreinforcement and response-outcome learning. It will be argued that these forms of learning are critical for the valence-based valuations on which much moral judgment (e.g., murder is bad and charitable giving is good) and decisions to commit (im)moral acts are based. But this is not to say that these two forms of emotional learning process give rise to the development of the system(s) that mediate all forms of moral reasoning. As previously noted (Nichols, 2002) , emotion-based mechanisms can generate judgments of ''badness" and undesirability. However, they cannot generate judgments of immorality. For example, an individual killing 10 people and a hurricane killing 10 people are both ''bad" events but only the first is usually considered to be immoral. Nichols has proposed that judgments of immorality require the participant accessing semantic knowledge. The individual has to ''recognize" the act as immoral based on their semantic concept of acts that are immoral. This may be the case. However, the learning/formation of conceptual structures will not be covered here.
Moreover, relatively recent theoretical work has stressed the importance of model-based reasoning/learning (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013) . As noted by Crockett (2013): ''The model-based system generates a forward-looking decision tree representing the contingencies between actions and outcomes, and the values of those outcomes. It evaluates actions by searching through the tree and determining which action sequences are likely to produce the best outcomes" (p. 363).
Importantly, the addition of a reference to a model-based system allows an explanation of various data regarding participants' reasoning on complex moral reasoning tasks such as the Trolley problem (in particular, side-effect vs. means variants of the Trolley problem; Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013) . These data cannot be explained through reference to stimulus-reinforcement and response-outcome learning that will be considered here. Notably though, the valence information that the model-based system likely relies on is determined by prior stimulus-reinforcement and response-outcome learning. Indeed, Crockett (2013) 
